Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

10-8-2012

Summary of Busefink v. Nevada, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 49
Nicole Scott
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Scott, Nicole, "Summary of Busefink v. Nevada, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 49" (2012). Nevada Supreme Court
Summaries. 147.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/147

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Busefink v. Nevada, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (October 4, 2012)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – VOTER REGISTRATION
Summary
The Court considered whether NRS § 293.805, which prohibits compensation
based on the number of voters registered, violated the First Amendment. Further, the
Court considered whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Disposition/Outcome
First, the Court determined that a “less exacting” standard of review is applicable
for NRS § 293.805. Under this review, the Court concluded that the statute does not
violate the First Amendment, as the State’s interest in preventing voter registration fraud
is a substantial regulatory interest that justifies the per-person registered payment ban.
Lastly, the Court concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Factual and Procedural History
Between August and September 2008, Amy Busefink, supervisor at the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN), approved and
implemented a new incentive plan that paid a $5 bonus to its voter registration canvassers
in Las Vegas if the workers returned twenty one or more voter registration applications.
Under this plan, several ACORN workers earned the $5 bonus.
Meanwhile, during an investigation regarding voter registration complaints
against ACORN, the Secretary of State’s office discovered the incentive program and
subsequently charged Busefink, ACORN, and ACORN’s field director for Nevada with
violation of NRS § 293.805(1) .2 During the preliminary hearing, the State provided
evidence demonstrating that ACORN had paid the bonus to several of its workers and
that some workers submitted fraudulent applications. In a motion to dismiss the
complaint, Busefink argued that NRS § 293.805(1) is unconstitutionally vague and
violates the First Amendment. The district court denied this motion and later sentenced
Busefink to one year in the Clark County Detention Center and a $4,000 total fine. This
sentence was later suspended, and Busefink received an informal probation and a 100hour community service requirement. Busefink appealed the District Court decision.
Discussion
Justice Gibbons wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court sitting in a threejustice panel. The questions before the Court were (1) whether NRS § 293.805 prompts a
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NRS 293.805(1) states “[i]t is unlawful for a person to provide compensation for registering voters that is
based upon: (a) [t]he total number of voters a person registers; or (b) [t]he total number of voters a person
registers in a political party.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.805(1) (2007).
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strict scrutiny standard of review or a “less exacting” standard; (2) whether NRS
§ 293.805 violates the First Amendment; and (3) whether NRS § 293.805 is
unconstitutionally vague.
Because the appeal was a constitutional challenge to a statute, the Court reviewed
the case de novo.3
I.

NRS § 293.805 prompts a “less exacting” standard of review

“More flexible” and “less exacting” standards of review apply when reviewing
the constitutionality of voting regulations.4 A court must “weigh the ‘character and
magnitude’ of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights against the interests the
State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State’s concerns
make the burden necessary” when analyzing whether a state election law violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.5 A state law imposing a “severe burden” on
these rights is subject to strict scrutiny. Where the state law imposes a “lesser burden,” it
is subject to a less exacting review, and a state’s “important regulatory interests’ will
usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”6
The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Grant held that a state’s blanket
ban of compensating petition circulators violated the First Amendment because it
ultimately limited the ability of a petition becoming an issue on a ballot.7 Several courts
have subsequently held that laws that ban payment of petition circulators on a per
signature basis are subject to strict scrutiny.8 Here, the Court disagreed with this
interpretation because the restriction at issue deals with voter registration canvassers
rather than petition circulators. Consequently, the burden on speech is less severe for
voter registration payments than for petition circulation payments. Further, the restriction
issue here is not a blanket ban on payments for voter registrations, but only on a perperson-registered payment system.
The Court found similarities between § NRS 293.805 and a statute analyzed in
Prete v. Bradbury where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a similar per-signature
payment prohibition did not severely burden First Amendment rights as petition
circulators could employ other manners of payment.9 Similarly, the law here restricts
only one type of payment and leaves the door open for other manners of payment. Thus,
NRS § 293.805 should be analyzed under a “less exacting” standard of review as it does
not place a severe burden on First Amendment rights.
II.
NRS § 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment as the State’s interest in
preserving the integrity of the election process justifies the restriction
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Because NRS § 293.805 is subject to a “less exacting” standard of review, the
Court subsequently analyzed whether the State has an “important regulatory interest” to
validate the restriction. As mentioned above, the Court first determined that NRS
§ 293.805 causes minimal harm to voter registration activities as there are other payment
schemes possible under the statute besides a per-person payment scheme.
Second, the Court found that the State has an important regulatory interest in
preventing fraud. Other courts have recognized incentives to commit fraud exist within
commission-based payment schemes.10 The legislative history surrounding § 293.805
indicates the Legislature was attempting to curb fraud.11 In addition, the Secretary of
State’s office submitted evidence that ACORN had returned fraudulent voter registration
applications. Because the possibility of fraud is genuine, the State has an important
regulatory interest in preventing voter-registration fraud. Thus, the Court concluded the
State’s interest in preventing fraud is amply substantial to justify NRS § 293.805’s
minimal burden on First Amendment rights.
III.

NRS § 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague

Busefink argued that the word “register[]” in the statute is vague and does not
include voter registration canvasser activities. In its analysis, the Court looked at a word’s
“well settled and ordinarily understood meaning”12 and also “every reasonable
construction . . . in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”13 The Court
determined “register” is not vague as the dictionary definition is “[t]o enroll formally or
officially.”14 Voter registration canvasser activities such as helping individuals complete
a voter registration application fit within the definition of register.
The Court disagreed with Busefink’s reliance on a proposal by the Secretary of
State to amend the statute to specifically define activities of voter registration organizers
and restrict a per-person registration payment scheme as evidence of vagueness.15 The
Court instead held the proposal would have delivered superior clarity to an already clear
statute.
The Court also disagreed with Busefink’s argument that the term “based upon” is
unconstitutionally vague in that it prohibits compensation based upon any consideration
to the number of persons a worker registered. Similar to the interpretation of “based
upon” in Project Vote v. Kelly, the Court held that the term is not unconstitutionally
vague, as an employer cannot use the quantity of voter registrations in a per-person
payment scheme.16
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Finally, the Court disagreed with Busefink’s argument that an intent requirement,
which would render the statute unconstitutionally vague, is absent in NRS § 293.805.
Instead, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that the statute has a general intent
requirement and the statute gives adequate notice of what activities are prohibited.
Conclusion
The Court found that NRS 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment nor is
the statute unconstitutionally vague. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of
Busefink’s conviction.

